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IntroductIon
Classical economic approaches to the study 
of preferences and risky choices assume that 
human preferences are stable and rational. 
However, subsequent empirical research 
has demonstrated that preferences are often 
constructed and that choices are influenced 
by a variety of factors that frequently deviate 
from normative decision-making models. 
While many of these studies have con-
firmed that preferences depend on presen-
tation formats, response modes, processing 
modes, mood states, attitudes, and a host 
of other moderators (e.g., Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, 2006), it should be noted that prefer-
ences are also a manifestation of a decision-
maker’s inherent values. While core values 
are often seen as relatively stable (Malle and 
Dickert, 2007), tradeoffs among those val-
ues are often ill-defined, setting the stage 
for preference reversals induced by contex-
tual factors that should not really matter 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). But how 
do values shape our preferences and guide 
our decisions? In the present article we con-
ceptualize preferences as manifestations of 
feelings and values, and briefly describe how 
they influence behavior in certain situations 
involving risk.
Specifically, we aim to show how values 
can manifest themselves as preferences and 
influence choices in situations where people 
make decisions about others whose lives are 
at risk. Touching on issues relevant for risk 
perception and risk management as well 
as the underlying processes of valuations 
that lead to preferences, we go beyond the 
common conceptualization of risky choices 
represented as outcomes with well-defined 
probabilities. Instead, our research focuses 
on and documents people’s inconsistent 
use of values when making decisions about 
whether or not to aid other people whose 
lives are endangered.
In our culture, most people would 
endorse a normative model asserting that 
every human life is intrinsically equal in 
value. This implies a linear relationship 
between the number of people at risk and 
the amount of money one should be willing 
to contribute in order to reduce or eliminate 
that risk. However, studies of actual behav-
ior show that, descriptively, this is hardly 
ever the case (e.g., Slovic, 2007). On the 
contrary, as the number of people at risk 
increases, the marginal rate of contributions 
decreases, revealing a general insensitivity 
to large losses of life (Fetherstonhaugh 
et al., 1997). In many cases, valuations are 
actually highest for a single individual life 
and decrease when more lives are at risk 
(Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Small et al., 2007). 
In our research, we examine the underly-
ing mechanisms that can explain some 
of the deviations between normative and 
descriptive models of helping behavior. In 
the remainder of this article, we highlight 
the role that affect plays in the construc-
tion of preferences for valuing the life of 
someone at risk and focus on some of the 
affective mechanisms we believe to be cen-
tral to lifesaving decisions.
the role of affect and affect 
regulatIon In valuatIons of 
people at rIsk
Decisions in situations of risk are 
strongly influenced by affective and emo-
tional responses of the decisionmaker 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). People often 
evaluate the risks, risk factors, and poten-
tial benefits on an affective dimension 
(Slovic et al., 2002). Charitable giving (as 
one expression of valuing other people’s 
lives) is likewise heavily influenced by our 
emotions (Andreoni, 1990; Batson, 1990; 
Slovic, 2007). In these situations, affective 
responses serve both as a way to inform the 
decisionmaker about the value they should 
place on other people at risk as well as con-
stitute a source of motivation underlying 
helping. In our research we have found that 
the motivating emotions vary in different 
stages of the valuation process (Dickert 
et al., 2011b). We show that valuations are 
constructed based on affective responses 
and follow a specific time-course that we 
model with two separate stages. According 
to this model, when confronted with the 
need to help someone at risk, people first 
consider how they feel about themselves 
to determine whether they will help or not 
(Stage 1). If they decide to help, people then 
determine the amount of help that they 
want to provide by consulting their feelings 
regarding the persons at risk (Stage 2). Thus, 
the decision to donate or not is primarily 
determined by affective responses that are 
focused on the self (e.g., how much better 
a person feels after helping someone else) 
and the amount donated is primarily deter-
mined by emotions that are focused on oth-
ers (e.g., sympathy and compassion).
As is evident from this distinction, behav-
ioral responses in the face of risk are not 
only affected by our feelings, but also exert 
an influence on them. Self-focused feelings 
may provide the basis for helping responses, 
but people also feel better about themselves 
after helping (Dickert et al., 2011c; Dunn 
et al., 2008). As such, emotion regulation 
and mood-management strategies become 
a critical component in valuations of people 
at risk. Similarly, emotion regulation also 
comes into play for other-focused emotions, 
as documented by the breakdown of com-
passion when we are confronted with large 
populations at risk (Slovic, 2010a). In order 
to better understand the role of affect (and 
affect regulation) in valuations and deter-
mine when feelings lead to an inconsistent 
use of values underlying choices, it is nec-
essary to take a closer look at the processes 
that lead to the generation of feelings.
factors InfluencIng the 
generatIon of affectIve 
responses In sItuatIons of rIsk
It is important to note that valuations of 
people at risk (and the underlying affective 
processes) are similar to other preferences in 
the sense that they are context-dependent. 
The way the risk is portrayed (e.g., by differ-
ent framing or presentation formats) greatly 
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summary
Although preferences and their underlying 
values are assumed to be stable by classical 
economic theory, empirical research has 
often shown deviations from normative 
principles and documented how preferences 
under risk are constructed and even shaped 
by seemingly irrelevant factors. What is 
remarkable about the construction of pref-
erence is its ubiquitous presence in nearly 
every decision-making domain. In accord 
with this idea, we argue that values (and 
valuations) can also be constructed and are 
therefore unstable. This is particularly evi-
dent in situations where valuations depend 
on affective responses (e.g., valuations of 
other people at risk). The research docu-
menting mental imagery and attention as 
underlying processes of affective responses 
and research showing individual differ-
ences as moderators of these processes help 
explain why we do not hold stable values 
for saving human lives. Descriptive models 
show that our responses to people at risk are 
not always rational nor immune from biases 
common to other forms of preference. We 
suggest that the processes leading up to 
inconsistencies in valuations are strongly 
related to affect and affect regulation strate-
gies. While most of us would probably agree 
that every life should be valued highly, our 
behaviors toward people in danger are often 
inconsistent with this belief.
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presentation format change the perception 
of risk for others (Dickert et al., 2011a). A 
consistent finding of these studies is that the 
concreteness and use of mental imagery in 
valuations of people at risk is moderated by 
the numerical ability of the perceiver. Lower 
numerical ability leads people to construct 
clearer mental representations and base 
their valuations on them, whereas people 
with higher numerical ability have more 
abstract mental representations that are 
not related to their valuations.
Another demonstration of how individ-
ual differences influence affective responses 
and valuations of people at risk comes 
from Kogut (2011), who has shown that 
people with a strong belief in a just world 
(i.e., those who believe the world is a just 
place) are more likely to blame others for 
their predicament and are less willing to 
provide help. Thus, their risk perception 
is prominently influenced by their general 
attitude toward blame and responsibility. 
More importantly, however, Kogut (2011) 
argues that these general attitudes influ-
ence valuations of lives particularly when 
the people at risk are depicted in a way 
that facilitates clearer mental images and 
stronger emotional responses (i.e., when 
they are identified).
attentIon
An additional precursor to the generation of 
feelings is the ability to focus one’s attention 
on the people at risk. In line with the effects 
of mental imagery, this is usually easier for a 
single individual at risk rather than a group 
of people (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996). 
In our research we have found that present-
ing similar individuals at risk as part of a 
group reduces affective responses to any 
single one of them (Dickert and Slovic, 
2009). Furthermore, affective responses 
such as sympathy toward a starving child 
decreased when the face of the child dis-
appeared from view. The nature of affec-
tive responses appears to be stronger when 
triggered by something immediate rather 
than reconstructed from memory. These 
results highlight the degree to which sim-
ple fluctuations in our attention can influ-
ence our feelings and thus our values. This 
helps explain why our responses toward 
opportunities to aid people whose lives are 
endangered are unstable and often incon-
sistent with normative principles that we 
nonetheless strongly endorse.
influences affective responses underlying 
these valuations. In our research we have 
given special considerations to processes 
related to (1) mental imagery, (2) individual 
differences, and (3) attention.
mental Imagery
Mental images are intimately related to 
emotional reactions. This is especially true 
for mental images that underlie risk per-
ceptions (Slovic, 2010a). The more vividly 
people in need are described the more likely 
we are to respond affectively and generate 
feelings underlying the valuation of their 
lives. Presentation formats that enhance 
mental imagery (e.g., showing the faces 
of people at risk and using information-
processing modes that facilitate clearer 
and more concrete mental representa-
tions) increase affective responses (Dickert 
et al., 2011a). Conversely, depicting people 
abstractly (e.g., as statistical lives rather than 
identified human beings) decreases affective 
responses and subsequent valuations (Small 
et al., 2007). In situations where a large 
group of people is at risk, it is likely that 
mental images are less concrete and emo-
tional responses less pronounced. Research 
has demonstrated that mental images (and 
the resulting cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses) are different for individuals than for 
groups (Hamilton and Sherman, 1996). It is 
easier to imagine a single person at risk than 
a group of persons. This causes affective 
responses to be strongest for a single indi-
vidual and considerably weaker as the num-
ber of people at risk increases (Kogut and 
Ritov, 2005), resulting in the  nonrational 
reaction where “the more who die, the less 
we care” (Slovic, 2010b).
IndIvIdual dIfferences
People differ in their values and attitudes 
toward risk (for themselves and others) 
as well as in their propensity to engage 
in information-processing that facilitates 
affective responses to risk. Generally more 
pro-social value orientations are related to 
feeling more distress and greater motiva-
tion to act in ways that are beneficial to 
others (Van Lange et al., 2007). Similarly, 
differences in affective reactivity, mental 
imagery, and information-processing styles 
play a role in the generation of feelings that 
underlie responses to risk. In our studies 
we have found evidence that differences in 
numerical ability together with variations in 
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